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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT: VISITATION 
AND CUSTODY OF PATENT LAW 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg* †
Introduction 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s relationship to patent law sometimes seems 
like that of a non-custodial parent who spends an occasional weekend with 
the kids. The custodial parent is, of course, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit. The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 consolidated 
intermediate appellate jurisdiction over patent law cases in this single court, 
which hears appeals from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), 
the U.S. District Courts, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, and the U.S. In-
ternational Trade Commission. Day to day it is the Federal Circuit that 
reviews contested decisions of the institutions that administer the patent sys-
tem. Congress created the Federal Circuit in order to achieve national 
uniformity, doctrinal stability, and predictability in patent law—leaving 
some question as to the appropriate role for the Supreme Court. The Su-
preme Court controls the frequency of its patent law visits, and it is free to 
grant certiorari more often if it is unhappy with the Federal Circuit’s stew-
ardship. But the Supreme Court has other work to do; it is an extraordinary 
year when it manages to review as many as three patent cases, as it did this 
past term. When each of these Supreme Court visits eventually comes to an 
end and everyday life resumes, it becomes plain once again that the Federal 
Circuit is, for all practical purposes, the parent in charge. 
The increasing propensity of the Supreme Court to grant review in pat-
ent cases suggests that it is concerned about how good a job the Federal 
Circuit is doing. But the consolidation of intermediate appellate jurisdiction 
in a single court presents special challenges for Supreme Court review. First, 
how does the Court decide which cases to review without circuit splits to 
signal important and contested issues? Second, what benchmarks can it use 
to evaluate the jurisprudence of a court that stands alone in its field? Third, 
how can it control future decisions of an expert court that disagrees with it? 
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I. Case Selection 
The small set of patent cases in which the Supreme Court has granted 
certiorari reveal several different signals that have drawn the Court’s atten-
tion to cases meriting review. 
First, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review cases in which 
the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisprudence is at odds with the treatment of 
similar issues in other fields of law. For example, in Dickinson v. Zurko, the 
Court considered whether it was appropriate for the Federal Circuit to ac-
cord less deference to factual findings of the PTO than courts accord to the 
findings of other agencies under the Administrative Procedure Act. And, in 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, the Court considered whether the standard 
for injunctive relief should be less stringent in patent cases than in other 
fields. 
Second, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari when it believes the 
Federal Circuit has departed from the Supreme Court’s own patent law deci-
sions. For example, the Court has granted certiorari twice in the last eight 
years in cases involving patent-eligible subject matter—an issue that the 
Court had repeatedly addressed in a series of decisions prior to the creation 
of the Federal Circuit. These grants occurred in J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. and in Laboratory Corp. of America 
Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. (although the Court later dis-
missed certiorari in Laboratory Corp. as improvidently granted). 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s own patent jurisprudence is mostly 
quite old, limiting its value as a guide to the most pressing unresolved issues 
today. 
Third, the Supreme Court has intervened to resolve internal divisions 
within the Federal Circuit. Thus, in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis 
Chemical Co. and Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, Co., 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review en banc decisions revealing 
sharp disagreements among the judges of the Federal Circuit as to the rules 
for determining patent infringement liability under the doctrine of equiva-
lents and the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, respectively. 
Fourth, in recent years the Supreme Court has increasingly sought and 
sometimes heeded the views of the Solicitor General before granting certio-
rari in patent cases. The Solicitor General’s views, in turn, are informed by 
the views and experience of the PTO. As an expert agency that administers 
the patent laws under the appellate oversight of the Federal Circuit, the PTO 
has a unique perspective on the patent jurisprudence of that court. The Su-
preme Court has sometimes ignored the recommendation of the Solicitor 
General to deny certiorari, as it did in J.E.M. and Laboratory Corp. But 
whenever in recent years the Solicitor General has urged the Supreme Court 
to grant certiorari in a patent case, it has done so, and the Court has ulti-
mately resolved the case in accordance with the Solicitor General’s advice. 
Recent examples include Merck KGaA v. Integra Life Sciences I, Ltd., KSR 
International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., and Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.  
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For many substantive issues of patent law, such as the nonobviousness 
standard reviewed in KSR, the Court has dusted off its own venerable case 
law for guiding principles, largely ignoring twenty-five years of more recent 
Federal Circuit decisions. In KSR, the Court relied primarily on six of its 
own prior opinions, beginning with the 1851 decision in Hotchkiss v. 
Greenwood and concluding with its 1976 decision in Sakraida v. AG Pro, 
Inc. The Court briefly mentioned two more recent Federal Circuit decisions 
that elaborated upon that court’s approach to nonobviousness but quickly set 
them aside, noting that “[t]hose decisions, of course, are not now before us 
and do not correct the errors of law made by the Court of Appeals in this 
case.” The Court did not use any Federal Circuit decisions as authority for 
identifying or explaining the errors made by the Federal Circuit in KSR. 
Fifth, the views of other amici in patent cases may also be playing a lar-
ger role in guiding the Supreme Court’s patent jurisprudence than they have 
in the past. The liberalization of rules for patent eligibility in the 1990s ex-
panded the universe of industries affected by patents, bringing divergent 
views before the Court in the form of amicus briefs from major corpora-
tions. For example, in eBay, amici filing briefs on behalf of the respondent 
included General Electric, 3M, Proctor & Gamble, DuPont, Johnson & 
Johnson, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, the 
Biotechnology Industry Organization, and numerous universities. The amici 
supporting the petitioner included Yahoo!, Time Warner, Amazon.com, 
Chevron, Cisco Systems, Google, Shell Oil, Visa, Xerox, and trade groups 
from the software and financial services industries. The presence of such 
sharp disagreements among powerful institutions signals to the Court the 
existence of an important and contested issue of law. Although amicus briefs 
are more common at the merits stage, they could be used more extensively 
at the certiorari stage to guide the Supreme Court in case selection. 
II. Benchmarks for Evaluation 
Beyond picking cases to review, the Supreme Court faces the additional 
challenge of how to second guess the Federal Circuit in a field where that 
court has been the dominant appellate authority for the past twenty-five 
years. On some issues, the Court can turn to non-patent cases as bench-
marks, as it did in Dickinson and eBay, but this approach could lead the 
Court to overlook good reasons for treating patent cases differently. The 
Court can also look more closely at the Federal Circuit itself. When the 
Court reviewed decisions of a divided Federal Circuit in Warner-Jenkinson 
and Festo, the Court turned to the Federal Circuit’s dissenting opinions for 
guidance in critiquing the majority opinions. Rarely, however, has the Su-
preme Court used Federal Circuit opinions in other cases as benchmarks for 
evaluating the cases currently before the Court. This is a regrettable omis-
sion that deprives the Supreme Court of the benefit of a quarter century of 
patent jurisprudence. It also deprives the Federal Circuit of the discipline of 
Supreme Court oversight of its performance in achieving uniformity, stabil-
ity and predictability in patent law. 
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The Supreme Court’s KSR opinion revealed fundamental disagreements 
with the Federal Circuit’s approach to nonobviousness analysis. The Court 
turned just about every move that the Federal Circuit has made to standard-
By ignoring close to a quarter century of Federal Circuit decisions, the 
Court’s KSR decision undermined the stability and predictability in patent 
law that Congress sought to achieve through the Federal Courts Improve-
ment Act of 1982. Moreover, by failing to situate its own decisions against a 
broader backdrop of Federal Circuit authorities, the Court missed an oppor-
tunity to clarify the implications of its decisions in a field of law that it visits 
infrequently—setting the stage for the Federal Circuit to read Supreme 
Court decisions narrowly in the future. 
III. Guiding Future Decisions 
The greatest challenge for the Supreme Court is to focus its limited at-
tention to patent law in ways that will do the most good for the patent 
system. If Supreme Court review achieves nothing more than correcting 
particular erroneous decisions of the Federal Circuit, it will almost surely 
waste time that could be better spent on other matters. Supreme Court deci-
sions are most likely to have an enduring impact on the Federal Circuit 
when they resolve discrete issues in ways that provide clear guidance for 
future cases. Decisions that call for flexible case-by-case analysis in the fu-
ture, while empowering the Federal Circuit to exercise its own judgment, are 
unlikely to change how that court decides cases. 
Consider the recent Supreme Court decision in KSR. The KSR District 
Court on summary judgment held a patent invalid for obviousness based on 
a combination of prior art references that disclosed different elements of the 
invention. The Federal Circuit, not satisfied that the prior art provided suffi-
cient teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the elements (under the 
so-called “TSM” test), reversed and remanded the case for trial. The Su-
preme Court reversed, admonishing the Federal Circuit to avoid the use of 
“rigid and mandatory formulas” in applying the nonobviousness standard. 
The Federal Circuit had applied the TSM test in a way that the Court found 
inconsistent with the “expansive and flexible approach” that has character-
ized the Supreme Court’s own decisions on the issue over the past 150 
years. 
While KSR was pending before the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit 
seemed to moderate its rhetoric in nonobviousness cases, going out of its 
way to show its flexibility. For example, the Federal Circuit reiterated in 
Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs, Inc. that the TSM standard can be satisfied im-
plicitly as well as explicitly, that it is not a rigid formula, and that it “has 
permitted us to continue to address an issue of law not readily amenable to 
bright-line rules, as we recall and are guided by the wisdom of the Supreme 
Court in striving for a ‘practical test of patentability.’ ” Although the Su-
preme Court took note of this and other recent cases in KSR, it left for the 
Federal Circuit to consider “[t]he extent to which they may describe an 
analysis more consistent with our earlier precedents and our decision here.”  
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ize and formalize nonobviousness analysis on its head. The Justices reiter-
ated the continuing vitality of the Supreme Court’s ancient skepticism 
toward patents that combine elements found in the prior art—a skepticism 
that stands in contrast to the Federal Circuit’s insistence on finding a teach-
ing, suggestion, or motivation to combine the elements before declaring 
such a combination obvious. The Justices repeatedly approved of resort to 
“common sense”—a phrase that the Federal Circuit has sometimes taken to 
be camouflage for “hindsight bias”—reminding the Federal Circuit that fear 
of the hindsight bias is no excuse for “[r]igid preventative rules that deny 
factfinders recourse to common sense.” The Court repeatedly invoked “mar-
ket forces” as likely to motivate improvements to the prior art and thereby to 
make them obvious, in contrast to the Federal Circuit’s own treatment of 
market demand for an invention as indicating that it must have been nonob-
vious if the problem nonetheless remained unsolved. They disapproved of 
the Federal Circuit’s focus on the problem the patentee was trying to solve 
as the point of departure for deciding whether the invention was obvious, 
preferring instead an “objective” approach that asks whether the claimed 
invention was an obvious solution to any known problem in light of the 
prior art. They even disapproved of the Federal Circuit’s standard bromide 
that an invention might be “obvious to try” and yet still nonobvious, noting 
that if a combination of elements is obvious to try with an expectation of 
success, “it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and 
common sense.” 
In the end, however, the Supreme Court did little to constrain the Fed-
eral Circuit beyond admonishing the Federal Circuit not to apply rigid rules. 
Indeed, by affirming that the ultimate determination of obviousness is a 
question of law rather than a question of fact, the Supreme Court left intact 
the plenary review power that has allowed the Federal Circuit to reshape 
obviousness doctrine over the years.  
As of this writing, the Federal Circuit has decided twelve nonobvious-
ness cases since the KSR decision came down. These cases suggest that KSR 
has had only a modest impact on the Federal Circuit so far. Three cases 
made no mention of KSR at all. On the other hand, KSR appears to have 
been decisive in one case, Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, 
Ltd., leading the Federal Circuit to reverse a close decision in the District 
Court that the challenger had failed to prove obviousness by clear and con-
vincing evidence. One other decision considers KSR at some length, while 
the others give it a more perfunctory citation. The Federal Circuit continued 
to cite its own prior nonobviousness decisions liberally, including pre-KSR 
decisions applying the TSM test.  
In theory, all of these decisions are subject to review by the Supreme 
Court, but it is hard to imagine that the Supreme Court plans to review 
nonobviousness decisions more than sporadically. Nonobviousness analysis 
is difficult and tedious. Moreover, it cannot be done properly without sus-
tained attention to technological details, a task that generalist courts have 
never relished.  
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Conclusion 
So long as the Federal Circuit avoids overt disregard for the Supreme 
Court’s teachings, it may be difficult to figure out whether the Federal Cir-
cuit has in fact taken those teachings to heart. The Court’s general 
admonitions to avoid the use of rigid and mandatory formulas will more 
likely change what the Federal Circuit says than what it does, making the 
Federal Circuit’s decisions more opaque and harder to follow.  
But the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court are not the only 
institutions that make up the patent law family. Perhaps the most important 
impact of the KSR decision will be on the PTO. The PTO, after all, 
supported certiorari in KSR and guided the Supreme Court toward the 
decision it reached. If KSR emboldens the PTO to reject more patent 
applications for obviousness without fear of reversal, that would be a 
significant change. Moreover, if the PTO perceives that the Federal Circuit 
is ignoring KSR, the Supreme Court may well heed the PTO’s call to revisit 
the issue with greater frequency in the future. That prospect may, in turn, 
give the Federal Circuit pause in reviewing decisions of the PTO. Although 
the Federal Circuit retains primary custody of patent law, its authority is 
inevitably diminished when the Supreme Court reverses its decisions. To 
avoid that outcome, the Federal Circuit, like any prudent parent, should pick 
its battles with care. 
